I think you mean 'without the presence of a human brain' (ie physical matter) because a 'mind' is as close if not closer to a non physical consciousness than it is to a physical brain.
And how do you know this is true, as opposed to the mind being the electrical signals that exist within the brain?
My response is that your evidence then needs to show that matter can exist without a consciousness perceiving it. It works both ways.
This is nothing but sophistry. You are claiming that it needs evidence to support it, knowing full well that it is an axiom. Axioms are not themselves supported by evidence. For example, your own axiom - that consciousness can exist without matter - is also not supported by evidence, nor can it be. Therefore, what matters is which of the two models makes less assumptions in order to provide the same amount of explanatory power.
Let's take the pincushion analogy you used a bit ago. I will agree for the sake of argument that the pincushion is physical reality and the pins are individual consciousnesses. The "matter model" proposes that consciousness is produced by physical reality. It requires three assumptions; that the pincushion and pins are all there is, that the pins cannot be removed from the pincushion, and that the pins are an outgrowth of the pincushion.
Your "consciousness model" proposes that physical reality is produced by consciousness. It requires five assumptions; that there is something more than the pincushion and pins, that the pins can be removed from the pincushion, that the pins can produce things outside of the pincushion, that something could produce the pincushion, and either that something could produce the pins or the pins always existed.
In short, even in a simplified analogy such as this, your "consciousness model" requires more assumptions than the "matter model". Furthermore, there may be additional assumptions on top of those; I stopped at five because that was more than sufficient to prove my point. This also presupposes that your "consciousness model" contains the same amount of explanatory power as the "matter model", which is not a given.
You have repeatedly claimed that your "consciousness model" requires less assumptions. As I have now demonstrated that the opposite is true, you should now either rebut my position or recant your own