According to Elton Trueblood, a philosopher:
"There must be an objective moral law; otherwise: (a) There would not be such great agreement on its meaning. (b) No real moral disagreements would ever have occurred, each person being right from his own moral perspective. (c) No moral judgment would ever have been wrong, each being subjectively right. (d) No ethical question could ever be discussed, there being no objective meaning to any ethical terms. (e) Contradictory views would both be right, since opposites could be equally correct."
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 499.
(a) is not so. Many people can agree on an objective moral law.
(b), (c), and (e) would violate the Law of Noncontradiction and as such are not possible.
(d) is self-explanatory.
Trueblood continues:
This moral law is beyond individual persons and beyond humanity as a whole: (a) It is beyond individual persons, since they often sense a conflict with it. (b) It is beyond humanity as a whole, for they collectively fall short of it and even measure the progress of the whole race by it.
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 499.
Geisler comments:
It is noteworthy that Trueblood’s form of the moral argument argues its validity in terms of its rationality. It reasons, in essence, that to reject the moral law is irrational or meaningless. That is, unless we assume the universe is irrational, there must be an objective moral law and, thereby, an objective Moral Law Giver.
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 499.
C.S. Lewis contributes:
1. There must be a universal moral law, or else: (a) Moral disagreements would make no sense, as we all assume they do. (b) All moral criticisms would be meaningless (e.g., “The Nazis were wrong.”). (c) It is unnecessary to keep promises or treaties, as we all assume that it is. (d) We would not make excuses for breaking the moral law, as we all do.
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 500.
Lewis again:
The Moral Law Is Not Herd Instinct. Lewis anticipates and persuasively answers major objections to the moral argument. Essentially, his replies are:
What we call the moral law cannot be the result of herd instinct or else the stronger impulse would always win, but it does not. We would always act from instinct rather than selflessly to help someone, as we sometimes do. If the moral law were just herd instinct, then instincts would always be right, but they are not. Even love and patriotism are sometimes wrong.
The Moral Law Is Not Social Convention. Neither can the moral law be mere social convention, because not everything learned through society is based on social convention. For example, math and logic are not. The same basic moral laws can be found in virtually every society, past and present. Further, judgments about social progress would not be possible if society were the basis of the judgments.
The Moral Law Differs from Laws of Nature. The moral law is not to be identified with the laws of nature. Nature’s laws are descriptive (is), not prescriptive (ought) as are moral laws. Factually convenient situations (the way it is) can be morally wrong. Someone who tries to trip me and fails is wrong, but someone who accidentally trips me is not.
The Moral Law Is Not Human Fancy. Neither can the moral law be mere human fancy, because we cannot get rid of it even when we would like to do so. We did not create it; it is impressed on us from without. If it were fancy, then all value judgments would be meaningless, including such statements as “Hate is wrong.” and “Racism is wrong.”
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 500.
Lewis recalls the thoughts he had as an atheist:
Just how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust. . . . Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too—for the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my private fancies. Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist—in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless—I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality—namely my idea of justice—was full of sense. [Mere Christianity, 45, 46]
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 500.
This is from Geisler:
Moral Absolutes. Before the absolute nature of morality can be understood, morality must be defined. Several things are meant by a moral obligation. First, a moral duty is good in itself (an end), not merely good as a means. Further, it is something we ought to pursue, a duty. Morality is prescriptive (an “ought”), not merely descriptive (an “is”). Morality deals with what is right, as opposed to wrong. It is an obligation, that for which a person is accountable.
An absolute moral obligation is:
an objective (not subjective) moral duty—a duty for all persons.
an eternal (not temporal) obligation—a duty at all times.
a universal (not local) obligation—a duty for all places.
An absolute duty is one that is binding on all persons at all times in all places.
Defense of Absolutes. Moral absolutes can be defended by showing the deficiency of moral relativism. For either there is a moral absolute or else everything is morally relative. Hence, if relativism is wrong, then there must be an absolute basis for morality.
Everything is relative to an absolute. Simply by asking, “Relative to what?” it is easy to see that total relativism is inadequate. It can’t be relative to the relative. In that case it could not be relative at all, ad infinitum, since there would be nothing to which it was relative, etc. Albert Einstein did not believe everything was relative in the physical universe. He believed the speed of light is absolute.
Measurement is impossible without absolutes. Even moral relativists make such statements as, “The world is getting better (or worse).” But it is not possible to know it is getting “better” unless we know what is “Best.” Less than perfect is only measurable against a Perfect. Hence, all objective moral judgments imply an absolute moral standard by which they can be measured.
Moral disagreements demand objective standards. Real moral disagreements are not possible without an absolute moral standard by which both sides can be measured. Otherwise both sides of every moral dispute are right. But opposites cannot both be right. For example, “Hitler was an evil man” vs. “Hitler was not an evil man” cannot both be true in the same sense (see FIRST PRINCIPLES). Unless there is an objective moral standard by which Hitler’s actions can be weighed, we cannot know that he was evil.
Moral absolutes are unavoidable. Total moral relativism reduces to statements such as “You should never say never,” “You should always avoid using always,” or “You absolutely ought not believe in moral absolutes.” “Ought” statements are moral statements, and “ought never” statements are absolute moral statements. So, there is no way to avoid moral absolutes without affirming a moral absolute. Total moral relativism is self-defeating.
Distinctions in Moral Absolutes. If there is an absolute basis for morality, then why do so many believe that all morality is relative? The reasons for this are mostly based on the failure to make proper distinctions.
Difference between Fact (Is) and Value (Ought). Relativists confuse fact and value, what is and what ought to be. What people do is subject to change, but what they ought to do is not. There is a difference between sociology and morality. Sociology is descriptive; morality is prescriptive. Relativists confuse the changing factual situation with unchanging moral duty.
Difference between Value and Instance of Value. There is confusion as well between an absolute moral value and changing attitudes regarding whether a given action violates that value. Once witches were sentenced as murderers, but now they are not. What changed was not the moral principle that murder is wrong. Rather, our understanding changed about whether witches really murder people by their curses. One’s factual understanding of a moral situation is relative, but the moral values involved in the situation are not.
Difference between Values and Understandings. A similar misunderstanding is over the difference between an unchanging value and a changing understanding of that value. A couple deeply in love better understand their love after twenty years. The love itself has not changed. Their understanding of it has changed.
Difference between End (Value) and Means. Often moral relativists confuse the end (the value itself) with the means to attaining that value. Most political disputes are of this sort. Both liberal and conservative politicians agree that justice should be done (the end); they merely disagree as to whose program is the best means to attain justice. Both militarists and pacifists desire peace (the end); they simply disagree as to whether a strong military best attains this peace.
Difference between Command and Culture. Another important difference, often overlooked by moral relativists, is that between the absolute moral command and the relative way a culture can manifest it. All cultures have some concept of modesty and propriety in greeting. In some a kiss is appropriate, while in others such intimacy p 502 would horrify. What should be done is common, but how it should be done differs. Failure to make this distinction misleads many to believe that because a value differs among cultures, the value itself (what) differs.
Difference between Applications. A legitimate discussion to decide which value applies to a given situation is not the same as a discussion over whether there is an absolute value. For example, we err if we think that anyone who believes a pregnant woman has the right to an abortion places no value on human life. They simply do not believe that the unborn are truly human beings. This debate is vastly important, but it should not miscommunicate the notion that the absolute good of protecting life is the issue on the floor. The issue is whether the unborn are human persons (see Geisler, chapter eight).
Conclusion. Moral absolutes are unavoidable. Even those who deny them use them. The reasons for rejecting them are often based on a misunderstanding or misapplication of the moral absolute, not on a real rejection of it. That is, moral values are absolute, even if our understanding of them or the circumstances in which they should be applied are not.
Sources
M. Adler, Six Great Ideas, Pt. 2
A. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind
N L. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues
C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man
———, Mere Christianity
E. Lutzer, The Necessity of Ethical Absolutes
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 501–502.
