You are assuming a mind has to be around. You are assuming that your assumptions are good. You are assuming that nobody else could be right. You are assuming you know what you're talking about.
I don't have to assume how wrong you are.
No, that is not an assumption. That is based on evidence of us only knowing about things through minds.
We know things through mind. Yes. However things only work/exist because of minds is the premise you are asserting. The is a positive assertion. It is what is called a unfalsifiable premise. An unfalsifiable premise isn't science, it is mere conjecture, a philosophical dead end.
I see nobody wants to read the page so I'm gonna have to spoonfeed it to you guys.
Putting aside all of the forgoing lines of argument, Berkeley declared, the whole issue can be allowed to rest on a single question: is it possible to conceive of a sensible object existing independently of any perceiver?
The challenge seems easy enough at first. All I have to do is think of something so remote—a tree in the middle of the forest, perhaps—that no one presently has it in mind. But if I conceive of this thing, then it is present in my mind as I think of it, so it is not truly independent of all perception.
Take heat, for example: does it exist independently of our perception of it? When exposed to great heat I feel a pain that everyone acknowledges to be in me, not in the fire, Berkeley argued, so the warmth I feel when exposed to lesser heat must surely be the same. What is more, if dip both of my hands into a bowl of tepid water after chilling one and warming the other, the water will feel both warm and cold at the same time. Clearly, then, heat as I perceive it is nothing other than an idea in my mind.
Similar arguments and experiments establish that other sensible qualities—colors that vary with changes in ambient light, tastes and smells that change perceptibly when I have a cold, and sounds that depend for their quality on the position of my ears and conditions in the air—are, like heat, nothing but ideas in my mind. But the same considerations apply to primary qualities as well, Berkeley pointed out, since my perception of shape and size depend upon the position of my eyes, my experience of solidity depends upon my sense of touch, and my idea of motion is always relative to my own situation. Locke was correct in his view of secondary qualities but mistaken about primary qualities: all sensible qualities are just ideas.
All of that is from the webpage I linked to.