I am in the middle of writing another post, but as part of the process of writing it, I figured out a key, critical problem with the Cosmological Argument. It relies on the Principle of Sufficient Reason - that nothing happens without a cause, but that since an infinite series of causes is impossible, there must have been a first, uncaused cause. Fair enough, at least for the sake of argument.
However, if an infinite series of causes is impossible because you need a first cause in order to have all the intermediate causes and the most recent cause, would that not also mean that other infinite series are also impossible, for much the same reason? For example, take the description "all-powerful". It cannot be true unless something is more powerful than everything else, yet in order to be that, it must be infinite, because otherwise something could be more powerful than it. Yet it cannot be infinite, because that would create a never-ending (and never-beginning) series of power levels.
The same problem applies to the other omnimax properties. They must be infinite in order to fulfill the quality of "all-whatever", yet they cannot be infinite because that would create an infinite series. In other words, the very Principle of Sufficient Reason that serves as the basis for arguing for that first, uncaused cause (because the string of causes can't be infinite) contradicts the idea of an omnimax entity (because its omni-attributes also can't be infinite, which means that they aren't omni in the first place).
Therefore, if the First Cause requires an omnimax being, then it cannot have happened, and the Cosmological Argument is false. There can still have been a first cause, but it cannot have had omni-attributes.