Materialism applied to the mind, epic fail?

[Gill]

If one accepts the materialistic premise X true;  " the thoughts in your consciousness are the products of atoms interacting".   

It would follow that premise X is the product of atoms interacting, since the premise is a thought.

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.   But, we know that to be false, therefore premise X cannot be said to be true with any certainty, and is then an assumption.

Therefore, the materialism approach to the mind is based on an assumption, no more or less valid then the assumption that the mind is not the products of atoms.

Unless of course, you disagree with the premise, which let's hear.....

[Azdgari]

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.

No you wouldn't.  You'd just have to have a way to tell true statements from false ones.

While you in particular seem to have trouble doing that, most of the rest of us manage to do it just fine.

[Gill]

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.

No you wouldn't.  You'd just have to have a way to tell true statements from false ones.

While you in particular seem to have trouble doing that, most of the rest of us manage to do it just fine.

And how would you tell?   Wouldn't your way of telling just be another product of atoms,  therefore still ambiguous to its truth?

[jynnan tonnix]

maybe I am missing something, but how does the actual validity of your thoughts matter? The question is how they got there. Wouldn't the same process hold true for coming up with a stroke of genius or one which turned out to be drivel?

[Add Homonym]

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.   

Or, you could demonstrate that anything in the Bibel was not written down by self same defective wankers.

Congratulations. You have become a philosopher. I recommend drowning yourself.

[Gill]

maybe I am missing something, but how does the actual validity of your thoughts matter? The question is how they got there. Wouldn't the same process hold true for coming up with a stroke of genius or one which turned out to be drivel?

Well how can one know if it's a stroke of genius or drivel if they start with a materialistic premise for thoughts, which is ambiguous for it's truth value?

The solution I find, is to abandon the idea that the mind is the product of material.   

[Add Homonym]

The solution I find, is to abandon the idea that the mind is the product of material.

Elegant solution for producing conclusions that have no repeatability.

[Gill]

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.   

Or, you could demonstrate that anything in the Bibel was not written down by self same defective wankers.

Congratulations. You have become a philosopher. I recommend drowning yourself.

Angry?  Why???

[Gill]

The solution I find, is to abandon the idea that the mind is the product of material.

Elegant solution for producing conclusions that have no repeatability.

Repeatability?  How about, a conclusion which allows one to expand their awareness beyond some limited materialistic understanding...

[Azdgari]

And how would you tell?   Wouldn't your way of telling just be another product of atoms,  therefore still ambiguous to its truth?

You'd tell in the same way that you would if your mind wasn't physical.  That is why this topic is a red herring for the purpose you're trying to use it for.

[penfold]

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.   But, we know that to be false, therefore premise X cannot be said to be true with any certainty, and is then an assumption.

Gill, really well put.

This is, at least to my mind, a serious problem with the materialistic account; in fact I would go so far as to say this is the most important deficiency in the materialist account.

Actually it is a reformulation of an old problem in philosophy (first discussed by David Hume) called the fact/value problem.

Let us take a generic example of "A believes that X". The question then is, on what grounds does A base his belief in x. The materialist would want to answer (in fact must answer) that A's belief has certain material antecedents. This has good experimental foundation; we can now predict a choice 'freely made' by a person up to 10 seconds prior to the subject becoming aware of making the choice (Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain - Siong Soon, Brass, Heinze & Haynes 2008). Thus the materialist would say, we have good empirical ground for showing that if we can provide a good enough material account of the world then the activities of the mind will become explicable.

However, the problem arises that the materialist story of cause and effect leading to A's belief in x is most unlikely to match up with A's own account of why they believe that x. The materialist account will be that of physical states linked together by cause and effect; A's account will be all about 'good reasons'. The two are clearly non-identical (I don't want to spend too much time here, as it is your argument - but this should be obvious, firstly in terms of sub-conscious determinants being part of the materialist account; and second in terms of A's account's inevitable use of priority - clearly a material story can only show causative priority, which is not the priority of 'reasons' we would find in A's account of their belief in x)

This means that any 'argument from reason' for materialism will be self defeating as any decent materialist would have to add the caveat "these good rational reasons for being a materialist WILL NOT be the actual explanation for anyone's belief in materialism".

The challange then is to try and match up our everyday use of 'good reasons' to justify belief with the material narrative of cause and effect leading to that belief. While there has been some work on this, everything I have read has been unconvincing. For example Dan Dennett (the leading materialist philosopher) in Elbow Room tries to give an evolutionary account of 'reasons' (often called teleobiology); but the account is noticeable for being completely unconvincing (unusual as Dennet is normally hugely compelling in his arguments).

However I would add one warning about your argument. It does show that materialism is incomplete in terms of accounting for belief and knowledge - ie it is epistemologically deficient. It does not show that materialism is incomplete in terms of describing reality - ie this does not show materialism to be ontologically deficient.

It would be an unjustified move to use this argument to show that the mind in itself is non-material. The argument relates to belief and knowledge, NOT to existence.

Anyhow kudos; really good argument. 

[Azdgari]

Gill, a heads up:  Penfold also thought that "An existing god exists necessarily" was a fairly decent argument for the existence of a god.  So don't read too much into it.

Penfold, how is this a problem with materialism?  What it seems to be is a problem with the idea of unconscious factors.  It arises as a "problem" for any theory of mind that includes components to the thought-process that the thinker is not consciously aware of.  This affects supernaturalism just as well as it does naturalism, only supernaturalism usually gets a pass in practice because it is not expected to form coherent explanations in the first place.

Notice how this has been pointed out already, and the reasons stated, but you chose not to address that obvious flaw to Gill's use of this argument against materialism.  Why is that?

[penfold]

Gill, a heads up:  Penfold also thought that "An existing god exists necessarily" was a fairly decent argument for the existence of a god.  So don't read too much into it.

If you had read my full post I made the point that NO ontological was valid (in fact I am more than happy to make the broader claim that no proofs of God of any kind are valid). My point was that the use of 'necessary' was a counter to the Gaulino's Island problem; which it is. Not to get too personal, but ad hominem attacks are better when you actually have taken the time to read the posts of the person you are criticizing...

...how is this a problem with materialism?  What it seems to be is a problem with the idea of unconscious factors.  It arises as a "problem" for any theory of mind that includes components to the thought-process that the thinker is not consciously aware of.  This affects supernaturalism just as well as it does naturalism, only supernaturalism usually gets a pass in practice because it is not expected to form coherent explanations in the first place.

I am not arguing for super-naturalism at all. My point is that materialism fails to provide a good account of the fact/value distinction.

A materialist account of a belief will take the following form: Some material precursors cause a certain brain state which correlates to a belief. This is fine, and to my mind probably true. The experiment I quoted in the post above provides us with good evidence for this account.

We can know two things about this materialist account of belief; (a) it will be causal (b) it will be descriptive.

However if we ask a person why they believe something, they will give us reasons. This account will not be (a) rational and (b) evaluative. ie "I believe so and so for the following good reasons."

Materialism cannot provide us with evaluative accounts only descriptive ones (this is obvious as no scientific account can admit of value - cf Popper, Kant, Hume etc...).

Let us take the example of a student's belief in Pythagoras' Theorem. If we asked her why she believes it we would expect her answer to take the form of reasons such as: “because of the following mathematical proof”; “because I have been taught it by my teacher”; “because when I apply it in the context of an exam it is marked as correct” etc... If we were to then ask her how important each factor was we would expect an intelligible answer; most likely elevating the mathematical proof over and above the other reasons.

The material description, on the other hand cannot determine what a 'good reason' for a belief is. From the causal story the student's belief in Pythagoras has as much to do with her attending school on a certain day as the validity of any mathematical proof.

So let us take belief in materialism. That is caused in exactly the same kind of manner as a belief in God, in that both are caused by particular material antecedents. To say (as we would want to) that materialism is a good belief and God is a bad belief, we require a theory of reasons which in turn requires an evaluative account.

None of this is controversial, all Gill and I have done is talk about a well known problem of philosophy. Dan Dennet (the most important materialist philosopher working today), spend the whole of the second chapter of Elbow Room trying to give a materialist account of reasons - materialist philosophers are well aware of the problem. I personally think his account is seriously lacking. I am happy to discuss his approach but not here, its not my OP.

Hope that helps

[12 Monkeys]

maybe I am missing something, but how does the actual validity of your thoughts matter? The question is how they got there. Wouldn't the same process hold true for coming up with a stroke of genius or one which turned out to be drivel?

Well how can one know if it's a stroke of genius or drivel if they start with a materialistic premise for thoughts, which is ambiguous for it's truth value?

The solution I find, is to abandon the idea that the mind is the product of material.

how come we all do not have the same level of intelligence if we are all created in one model? God loves slaves and rape and genocide......so he had to have those of lesser intelligence?.....we call them religous

[Azdgari]

If you had read my full post I made the point that NO ontological was valid (in fact I am more than happy to make the broader claim that no proofs of God of any kind are valid). My point was that the use of 'necessary' was a counter to the Gaulino's Island problem; which it is.

I was referring to your denouncing of the bulk of the responses to that argument in the thread.  Further, I never said you'd called the argument valid.  You said his argument was elegant, neat, honest, etc.  Hence my use of the word "decent" above.  While his following posts in that thread were so obviously stupid and unthinking that they could only reasonably be considered to be an exercise in trolling, you managed to overlook that in order to denounce the rest of us as overly aggressive and unfair.  Which brings us to...

Not to get too personal, but ad hominem attacks are better when you actually have taken the time to read the posts of the person you are criticizing...

Back at you re: not reading this part of the post I'd just written.  And re: the "ad hominem" - you've done the same thing in that other thread.  You didn't bother to address much of the content of peoples' posts, opting to dismiss them as overly aggressive and unfair.  Interestingly, you never responded to kcrady's post in that thread...

I am not arguing for super-naturalism at all. My point is that materialism fails to provide a good account of the fact/value distinction.

Neither does supernaturalism.  Which is my point:  This is not a problem with materialism per se.

Materialism cannot provide us with evaluative accounts only descriptive ones (this is obvious as no scientific account can admit of value - cf Popper, Kant, Hume etc...).

Agreed on the bracketed text, but that conscious minds can apply value to the materialistic account, as you well know.  From the perspective of a conscious mind, the descriptive account can function as an evaluative account, since the materialistic elements have value to the conscious mind, as does their outcome.  And the question of whether a belief is true is only meaningful from the perspective of a conscious mind.

Let us take the example of a student's belief in Pythagoras' Theorem. If we asked her why she believes it we would expect her answer to take the form of reasons such as: “because of the following mathematical proof”; “because I have been taught it by my teacher”; “because when I apply it in the context of an exam it is marked as correct” etc... If we were to then ask her how important each factor was we would expect an intelligible answer; most likely elevating the mathematical proof over and above the other reasons.

The material description, on the other hand cannot determine what a 'good reason' for a belief is. From the causal story the student's belief in Pythagoras has as much to do with her attending school on a certain day as the validity of any mathematical proof.

The materialistic details of her thought process in coming to her conclusion are evaluated as either good-quality, or poor-quality, from the materialist's perspective.  This is a valuation.

So let us take belief in materialism. That is caused in exactly the same kind of manner as a belief in God, in that both are caused by particular material antecedents. To say (as we would want to) that materialism is a good belief and God is a bad belief, we require a theory of reasons which in turn requires an evaluative account.

See above.

None of this is controversial, all Gill and I have done is talk about a well known problem of philosophy. Dan Dennet (the most important materialist philosopher working today), spend the whole of the second chapter of Elbow Room trying to give a materialist account of reasons - materialist philosophers are well aware of the problem. I personally think his account is seriously lacking. I am happy to discuss his approach but not here, its not my OP.

This is an entirely appropriate thread for that topic.  And you have given no reason as to why this "problem" is restricted to materialism, which was my original objection and which you have not touched...

[velkyn]

interesting that Gill decides to open up one more thread that is pretty much exactly like the other one that he's failing in.   And he still can't show any of his premises are valid.

[jaimehlers]

If one accepts the materialistic premise X true;  " the thoughts in your consciousness are the products of atoms interacting".   

It would follow that premise X is the product of atoms interacting, since the premise is a thought.

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.   But, we know that to be false, therefore premise X cannot be said to be true with any certainty, and is then an assumption.

When you can determine whether a premise is true or false by how the atoms that make it up interact, then this statement might be valid.  As it is, it is a red herring.

Therefore, the materialism approach to the mind is based on an assumption, no more or less valid then the assumption that the mind is not the products of atoms.

Unless of course, you disagree with the premise, which let's hear.....

Your logic is flawed; it is like saying you can't tell whether a statement is true or false because both are made up of words, therefore you have to assume it true without being able to demonstrate that it's true, and someone who assumes it false has just as valid a position as you do.

Yet, if I say, "the sun rises in the west", you can immediately tell that is a false statement, because of a specific word I chose to use instead of another specific word which would have made the statement true.  In other words, you can demonstrate that it is false in a way that can be verified to other people.  The same concept goes for other things, although the exact process can differ.

[penfold]

Azdgari,

I think this is a particular problem for materialism per se because materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material terms; which must include beliefs.

If we were to take a subtler monist system like the logical positivism of Ryle then the fact/value distinction is less of a problem.

But I re-iterate, I am not comparing materialism to anything other system, rather I am pointing out problem with materialism...

I would agree that this is not a problem unique to materialism , in fact the first philosopher to talk of it used it to attack Cartesian Dualism! (And I do apologize; you're quite right I should have acknowledged your point in my last post, it was rude of me not to). But this problem is profound; and materialism (as much as any other system) requires a response.

Out of interest, do you think we can give a materialist account of  reasons?

Being highly sympathetic of materialism myself I struggle with it. On the one hand we could perhaps do away with the need for evaluative reasons at all, but this is bleak and we must accept that we are doomed to believe what we believe and no amount of good reasons will justify them (it would certainly make a forum like this a bit pointless). On the other hand we require a materialist account of reasons and I, for one, cannot think of one.

[Azdgari]

I think this is a particular problem for materialism per se because materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material terms; which must include beliefs.

And a combined supernaturalism/materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material and/or supernatural terms.  This yields no better results, in terms of explaining beliefs.  So why the focus on materialism?  Seems a bit of a red herring to me.  Understandablel from someone who has a beef against materialism, like Gill, but the red herring is more surprising from you.

If we were to take a subtler monist system like the logical positivism of Ryle then the fact/value distinction is less of a problem.

I am not familiar with Ryle.  Rather than name-drop, you could express what you meant in more detail.  Name-dropping is a good way to tell a layman that he's not qualified to discuss the topic, but it's not a very effective way of actually having a discussion with said layman.

But I re-iterate, I am not comparing materialism to anything other system, rather I am pointing out problem with materialism...

Which is a problem.  Because if materialism is not different in this respect, compared to any other system, then the problem is not really materialism's, but is instead a universal problem.  The focus on materialism is a red herring.

I would agree that this is not a problem unique to materialism , in fact the first philosopher to talk of it used it to attack Cartesian Dualism! (And I do apologize; you're quite right I should have acknowledged your point in my last post, it was rude of me not to). But this problem is profound; and materialism (as much as any other system) requires a response.

Then the problem should be addressed on its own grounds instead of being approached as a unique problem of materialism, as the OP has done (the OP you complimented so heartily).

Out of interest, do you think we can give a materialist account of  reasons?

Yes.  But it might not be an emotionally satisfying account to a non-materialist.

Being highly sympathetic of materialism myself I struggle with it. On the one hand we could perhaps do away with the need for evaluative reasons at all, but this is bleak and we must accept that we are doomed to believe what we believe and no amount of good reasons will justify them (it would certainly make a forum like this a bit pointless). On the other hand we require a materialist account of reasons and I, for one, cannot think of one.

The problem you describe is more one of personal accountability and free will, rather than one of describing "reasons".

[Gill]

And a combined supernaturalism/materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material and/or supernatural terms.  This yields no better results, in terms of explaining beliefs.  So why the focus on materialism?  Seems a bit of a red herring to me.  Understandablel from someone who has a beef against materialism, like Gill, but the red herring is more surprising from you.

No, I don't have a beef against materialism.  I just find that philosophy limiting when attempting to apply it to everything.   Just like I find extreme rationalism, or intuition limiting when trying to apply them everything.     So why not use a combination of these things?  I do....

[Azdgari]

Methodologies, like scientific rationalism, which are designed to weed out wrong ideas, will always be limiting to people who have an emotional desire to hold those wrong ideas.

[jdawg70]

And a combined supernaturalism/materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material and/or supernatural terms.  This yields no better results, in terms of explaining beliefs.  So why the focus on materialism?  Seems a bit of a red herring to me.  Understandablel from someone who has a beef against materialism, like Gill, but the red herring is more surprising from you.

No, I don't have a beef against materialism.  I just find that philosophy limiting when attempting to apply it to everything.   Just like I find extreme rationalism, or intuition limiting when trying to apply them everything.     So why not use a combination of these things?  I do....

Gill, I think you need to established exactly what limitations you're having a problem with.  I mean, the search for truth is inherently limiting - it is meant to limit the domain of knowledge to that which is only true.  Is it really problematic for me to have some means of discarding falsehoods?

Obviously this is *not* what you're arguing, but I need you to spell it out for me.

[velkyn]

And a combined supernaturalism/materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material and/or supernatural terms.  This yields no better results, in terms of explaining beliefs.  So why the focus on materialism?  Seems a bit of a red herring to me.  Understandablel from someone who has a beef against materialism, like Gill, but the red herring is more surprising from you.

No, I don't have a beef against materialism.  I just find that philosophy limiting when attempting to apply it to everything.   Just like I find extreme rationalism, or intuition limiting when trying to apply them everything.     So why not use a combination of these things?  I do....

because your your claims are baseless.  They have nothing to support them.    Reality is very limiting to those who want to make nonsense up.

[Gill]

I'd hardly call  rationalism baseless since it's  something which science uses all the time.

[velkyn]

I'd hardly call  rationalism baseless since it's  something which science uses all the time.

problem is that I don't see you using reason, you use baseless claims.  Nothing of your claims is based in evidence which trumps any claim of some magic "knowing" that you seem to claim.  science is based in that. 

I see claims that yours must be true even if everything demonstrates them not to be.  You have claims that are said by you, to be absolutely unsupportable since they are now magically limitless.   If you are using the philosophical defintion of rationalism, then we also have problem because it's not well supported either.  There is no evidence that we somehow magical know things with no external source.  Intuition is at best soemthing that works only part of the time.   science may use rationalism to get a hypothessis but it's facts that win out everytime and rationalism never always gives hypotheses that always pan out, as it should from reading your claims about it. 

[dloubet]

For this premise to be true as opposed to an assumption, one would have to demonstrate that the products of atoms interacting will always produce true statements.

No. The premise is true or false regardless of our ability to demonstrate it. Reality does not bend to our assumptions or demonstrative abilities.

And saying that atomic interactions produce statements is like saying that DNA contains information. It doesn't. It's just chemistry.

[Azdgari]

Gill, I think you need to established exactly what limitations you're having a problem with.  I mean, the search for truth is inherently limiting - it is meant to limit the domain of knowledge to that which is only true.  Is it really problematic for me to have some means of discarding falsehoods?

Obviously this is *not* what you're arguing, but I need you to spell it out for me.

^^ This.  Except for the last part, which I don't think is obvious at all.

[Gill]

And a combined supernaturalism/materialism wishes to explain all phenomena in material and/or supernatural terms.  This yields no better results, in terms of explaining beliefs.  So why the focus on materialism?  Seems a bit of a red herring to me.  Understandablel from someone who has a beef against materialism, like Gill, but the red herring is more surprising from you.

No, I don't have a beef against materialism.  I just find that philosophy limiting when attempting to apply it to everything.   Just like I find extreme rationalism, or intuition limiting when trying to apply them everything.     So why not use a combination of these things?  I do....

Gill, I think you need to established exactly what limitations you're having a problem with.  I mean, the search for truth is inherently limiting - it is meant to limit the domain of knowledge to that which is only true.  Is it really problematic for me to have some means of discarding falsehoods?

Obviously this is *not* what you're arguing, but I need you to spell it out for me.

Aren't I pointing out a limitation with this thread's topic?   I find materialism limiting if trying to understand all of awareness and reasoning.   But,  just as limiting I find other things like intuition if trying to understand say, the chemical composition of a rock.....

[Azdgari]

Aren't I pointing out a limitation with this thread's topic?

No.  Not a limitation of materialism.  The problem remains under any sort of mysticism one can imagine, including yours.

I find materialism limiting if trying to understand all of awareness and reasoning.   But,  just as limiting I find other things like intuition if trying to understand say, the chemical composition of a rock.....

It is limiting in that it doesn't provide the answers you desire.  But that's a good limitation - at least, it is if you value truth.  Jury's out on that one.